## FW

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Third, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Ontology must be secondary to the prior question of political practice

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

## China Framing

**Assessing Chinese motivation is possible and epistemologically useful---**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**,

Claremont McKenna College “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

First, **motives can be known**. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The **possibility** that information may be flawed should **not lead to a rejection of all information**. People make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104¶ Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that the security dilemma exists because of a **lack of motivational knowledge,** so the proper response is to try to **enhance understanding of motives,** **not discard motivational knowledge altogether**. Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶ **Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China**, because mutually preferable outcomes **can be achieved** if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, **valuing motivational assessments empowers policymakers** to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of **reducing competition and conflict**.

**This is a reason to combine approaches pragmatically via the permutation**

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE OF CHINA”,” 2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

This brief overview of some of the different theoretical positions applied to the rise of China should give an idea of the quandary of the policymaker. The debates between different theoretical positions are complex and obscure, but the differences in prescribed policy can be enormous. For example, should the U.S. pursue economically independent trade policies with China? Isolating all other competing theoretical factors, the decision can come down to technical methodological agreements. A policymaker **has to make a choice**, and she has little way of knowing which choice is correct. And the problem is all the more serious when theorists claim that **the wrong choice could lead to great power war.** One possible option is to choose a theory and stick with it. This would make analysis and decisions straightforward. Additionally, it would establish predictability in policy behavior, reducing security concerns stemming from uncertainty. But there are two major drawbacks. First, the theory could be wrong. Dogmatically pursuing an incorrect theory would be much more disastrous than tentatively wavering between different theories. Second, some theories do not apply to every aspect of a relationship, creating indeterminate decisions. ¶ Perhaps the most sophisticated attempt to solve this problem is Peter J. Katzenstein’s case for “**analytical eclecticism**.” 173 Analytical eclecticism attempts to abandon the deep theoretical backing behind different theoretical positions, and **combine relevant elements of implemented theory in “explanatory sketches**.” 174 The benefit of the approach is that is allows flexible access to a large amount of relevant knowledge **without having to take sides in the theoretical debates**. Analytical eclecticism could be the best option, but there are four potential problems. First, it assumes complementary theoretical combinations, but the real problems are when different theories are contradictory. 175 Promoting deep economic interdependence is either a good idea or a terrible one, and combining realist and liberal understandings on trade is probably impossible. Second, it artificially elevates constructivism because constructivism’s greater compatibility with other theories. Third, it discounts theories that make few contextual claims. In particular, offensive realism’s long-term forecast of conflict between China and the U.S. will not necessarily manifest itself with any signs at this stage. Consequently, policymakers might be tempted to ignore its warnings for greater descriptive ability. My point is that this creates a systemically arbitrary criterion for theory selection, not that offensive realism ought to be followed. Fourth, it allows policymakers to pick and choose theoretical elements that fit their personal preference. This could be seen as a good way to empower policymakers, but it is also arbitrary.

## K

**Neolib’s inevitable and movements are getting smothered out of existence—no alternative economic system**

**Jones 11**—Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled. Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa. Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning." The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a **coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains,** it seems, **as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.** There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually **smothered out of existence**. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement. But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, **although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.**

#### Negative ontological critique replicates a “damage-focused” theory that rein scribes violence toward Blackness – an optimistic reading of “what might be” and prioritizing complexity” is key.

McCune, J. (2012). A good black manhood is hard to find: Toward more transgressive reading practices. *Spectrum: A Journal on Black Men*, 1 (1), 121-140.

The adage, “a good black man is hard to find,” has been a common refrain in black cultural communities for decades. Using this common saying as a departure point, this essay turns to a similar sentiment within scholarship and challenges readers of black men to move toward more transgressive reading practices. Using performative texts, this essay explores how we might develop new reading practices of a “complex black manhood,” moving beyond a good/bad binary. Jamal Joseph’s pastiche visual collection, Tupac Shakur Legacy and Tarrell Alvin McCraney’s play, The Brothers Size teaches us how to read black men’s bodies and practices of masculinity in new ways. This essay explores how both Joseph and McCraney activate a black radical imaginary that does not begin with damage, but tells an uneasy and complex narrative of black manhood through (re)presentations and resistance to the dominant gaze toward black male deviance. The authors of these texts encourage new reading practices—of “what might be” in black manhood—which move us away from canonical prejudices and reorients us toward new, complex (de)scripts for black men. [End Page 121]¶ … the way our society is working now, only negative images of the black community are portrayed world wide, only those are put so that I can read em’!¶ —Tupac Shakur, “Tupac Shakur Speaks”¶ Black males today live in a world that pays them the most attention when they are violently acting out.¶ —bell hooks, We Real Cool¶ I am large, I contain multitudes.¶ — Walt Whitman, “Song for Myself”¶ Everywhere—from the grocery store, on the train, at church, and even across holiday family dinners—I have heard black women (and some men) scream with great anxiety that, “a good black man is hard to find!” This has been a historic lament that articulates an absence of “descent, quality brothaz,” black men who are ready to treat their partners in ideal and respectable ways. These cadres of black men are those who “got it together,” “are on point,” “have it goin on,” or simply “take care of their responsibilities.”1 When presented with such concerns, I often return to the wisdom of my grandmother, who told my cousin, “you just ain’t looking in the right places, honey”—her own way of challenging these laments, while reminding my cousins that good black men do exist. My grandmother’s retort notes something most important about the claim that there is some lack of good black men: it is most contingent upon where he/she goes to find the black man of his/her dreams, as well as what the seeker understands as good. As much as I hate to contradict grandma’s theorization, I have to be the bad grandson and suggest that most of these evaluations of men are rendered as the result of bad reading practices. Thus, this essay suggests a modification to grandma’s emphasis on the location of looking, toward developing new reading practices for black men’s complex performances of manhood.¶ This dilemma, of locating the “good” in black men or ideas of manhood, is not one exclusive to those seeking relational partners. In fact, this conundrum is at the core of academic and popular discourse that explores the interplay of race and gender. How do we, in an age where blackness is always already demonized or made dangerous, carve a space for the “good” in blackness and black people? While the concerns of the academy have definitely shifted away from positivist constructions, there is a clear longing for redemption for the circulation of nebulous ideas about black men. While so much of popular discourse around finding “good black men” is one of ontological suspicion, it should be more aptly understood as a preoccupation with perceived ill action.¶ Today, in the age of President Barack Obama, much of what is understood as good in black men is shaped by ideas of exceptional acts. The surprise over Barack Obama’s successful presidential campaign brought my attention to America’s lack of faith in black men’s possibilities. In addition, the continuous [End Page 122] construction of President Obama as exceptional affirmed that there is an ideological ghost that haunts black men—an archive of black men acting out. While this ideological move is not new in terms of America’s shaping of blackness more generally, today the actual roles of black men in these unprecedented positions are beginning to reinforce and uproot many age-old “exceptional” constructions. Here, black male figures that possess character and charisma identical to Barack Obama are considered exceptions within the larger pool of black men, who too often function within enigmatic cultural registers.2 Ironically, even in the esteemed position of president, Obama is still understood as always having a propensity toward “terror.” Hence, the seemingly ridiculous, but real, debate over his religious affiliation, which (in)advertently suggests he is a part of a “terrorist” lineage.¶ Together, the inability to see black men as “good,” and to disaggregate blackness from deviance, situates men who move outside the norm of demonized blackness into an “exceptional” category. As a result, we are always left with “typical vs. exceptional,” “hero vs. villain,” and “good vs. bad” frameworks that unnaturally situate black men in either/or existences rather than both/and positionalities. Indeed, media has enforced a racialized “script,” which forces black men to carry such singular fictions (Jackson, 2007, p. 22). This script has been not only adopted by dominant society, but also within marginalized groups in the form of racial doubt. What is established, in this oscillation between the good and the bad, is what Frank Rudy Cooper calls representations of “bipolar Black Masculinity.” Here, “a Bad Black Man… is crime-prone and hypersexual and a Good Black Man… distances himself from blackness and associates with white norms” (Cooper, 2005, p. 853). Consequently, how we read and (mis)understand black men becomes most relevant to this discussion. Rather than search or privilege some idealized version of the “good,” I would like to offer an alternative reading of black men as always already complex, multiple, and beyond “either/or.” It is imperative that as scholars and readers of gender we move beyond and against the “bipolar” black masculine representations.¶ This critical essay is largely a response to the anxieties of scholars and friends who often tire of having to assess what black men look like while “acting out,” but desire ways we may ever deem black men “good.” While the commitment here is not to create positive representations of black men, it is important that we challenge the rhetorical weight given to negative categorizations that are continuously coupled with black men and manhood. Thus, this is a rhetorical strategy that I argue could pose serious threats to the neatly packaged demonization that has discursively handcuffed the black masculine. If we commit to pushing “good” beyond the complimentary and toward the richly complex, [End Page 123] we are better equipped to deem some black male everyday performances, imagining, and lives as representative of a “good black manhood.” Rather than do what Patricia J. Williams (1995) has called “exceptionalizing those few blacks [society] acknowledges as good” (p. 241), I wish to draw attention to performances by black men that offer no easy resolution to society’s anxieties, while also moving away from reaffirming such angst.¶ In moving toward visual and dramatic performance, we are able to better see how reading practices can be both manufactured and mainstreamed. Performance, contrary to popular belief, depends on complex reading practices for its success and acts as a pedagogy for how reorientation acts to reconstitute (black male) subjects. Much of the excitement of performance can be found in the always anticipatory “what might be there” in the visual representation of things, individual characters, or the complex unfolding of the plot or narrative. The intentional exploration of “what might be there” in performance is instructive as we examine “what might be there” in black manhood, moving beyond historical and ideological assumptions that presently frame both our critique and common public imaginings of the black and masculine. If we move to a “what might be there” of black manhood, rather than “what is there,” we advance an ideological gaze that intentionally attempts to read more than is evident and available within “common” knowledge. My supposition here is that performance shows us a site where intentional choices are made to provoke and conjure particular reading practices. Such a manipulation of the gaze, in turn, may manufacture black male subjects that are understood with a richer complexity and defy common, mainstream perceptions of blackness and black manhood.¶ In essence, a “good black manhood” is a complex representation, which requires intentionally complex reading practices. Hence, it is a productive exercise to bring attention to “other” performances of black manhood that cannot be enveloped in the categories of bankruptcy and corruption that have become quite synonymous with the black and the masculine. Evelyn Tuck (2009) argues that a major problematic trend when dealing with “native communities, city communities, and other disenfranchised communities… is damage-centered research” (p. 409). In line with this thinking, it may be necessary—at least, for this project—to place a “moratorium on damage-centered research” (Tuck, 2009, p. 423). Rather than begin with a framework that assumes black men are broken or trapped, I believe it is more apt and appropriate to unpack the complex makeup of black male communities, which understands itself not as “hyper,” but pushes toward greater humanization. This humanizing framework—I am calling complex manhood—borrows from Avery Gordon’s (1997) notion of “complex personhood” where “all people remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, and [End Page 124] recognize and misrecognize themselves and others” (p. 4). Within this cultural framework, black men’s performances of masculinity are not inundated with any totalizing narrative or that of anomaly, but always imagined and understood as being multiple and socio-historically produced. Our assessments of black men from the “complex” vantage point always begins from the place of understanding masculinities as always troubled, but simultaneously potentially transgressive. Furthermore, this critical and necessary move demands that we not only recognize black men’s performances as complex and diverse, but also employ more transgressive reading practices of black male performances. In some senses my grandmother’s earlier response approximates a transgressive reading practice—as she offers a “critical generosity” that moves beyond quotidian readings of damaged masculinity toward a need to “acknowledge the ideological systems that promote canonical prejudice” (Roman, 1998, p. xxvi).¶

#### The alternative fails, it just adds another voice in the mix, but leaves foundational assumptions unchallenged

Shome, 1996

[Raka, Doctoral candidate at univ of Georgia, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An “other” view.” Communication theory, Vol. 6 issue 1, February, 40-59, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library,] /Wyo-MB

In fact, **even when we do sometimes try to break out of the Eurocen- tric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and unchal- lenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and unchallenged.** Instead of examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western hegemony, we fre- quently use the canon to appropriate “other” voice^.^

**Racism not the root cause of all violence**

**Mertus 99**

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**This paper examines the role of racism as a cause of or factor in wars and civil conflicts.** “Racism” as understood here is defined broadly to encompass acts and processes of dehumanisation. The conflicts in **Rwanda and Kosovo serve as case studies; the former illustrates a case where the racist nature of the conflict has been clear to most observers, and the latter represents a case where racism plays an important yet overlooked role. Racism did not cause either conflict. Rather, the conflicts were the outcome of political manipulation and enlargement of already existing group classification schemes and social polarisation, a history of real and imagined oppression and deprivation, the absence of the rule of law and democratic structures, and state monopoly over the provision of information. Under such conditions, political élites could use racist ideology as a method of gaining power and, when necessary, waging war.**

#### Blacks aren’t ontologically dead and Wilderson offers no alternative

SAËR MATY BÂ, teaches film at Portsmouth University, September 2011 "The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation" book review of Red, Black & White: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms and Mama Africa: Reinventing Blackness in Bahia, Cultural Studies Review volume 17 number 2 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index pp. 381–91]

Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### No social death – history proves

Brown 9 Vincent, Prof. of History and African and African-American Studies @ Harvard Univ., December, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON’S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with “survivals” or “retentions” of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park’s view of “the Negro” predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits ex- amined “Africanisms”—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park’s, who empha- sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits’s line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. 35 Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by “slave crime.”36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ- ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of “the slave” with what they were learning about the en- slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson’s definition of slavery. “If slaves were in fact ‘generally dishonored,’ ” Craton asked, “how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of ‘reputation’ and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?” How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been “natally alienated” by definition? Finally, and per- haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to “permanent violent domination,” they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the “varied manifestations of their resistance” that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes “fatally.”38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson’s description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their “tropical temperament.” The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow- erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re- sistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker’s analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul- tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom “the rupture was the story” of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the “perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles.”39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City’s 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a “shared cultural heritage” that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the “various steps Africans made in the process of becoming ‘African American’ in culture, orientation, and identity.”40

**Realism is inevitable—states will always seek to maximize power**

John **Mearsheimer**, Professor, University of Chicago, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS, **2001**, p. 2.

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, **great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states.** But **great powers** do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their **ultimate aim is to be the hegemon**-that is, **the only great power in the system.**

**Wars employ institutional racism to fuel foreign exploits**

Cynthia **Peters**, **No Date**, Life After Capitalism Essays. U.S. Anti War Activism

**This is a new element of war** -- one that the anti-war movement needs to be more conscious of. And that is that the **war isn't limited to** the **bombings**, n**or** even the **economic sanctions** and the free trade agreements (which also kill and destroy), but it continues on with the waves of immigrants who come to our country out of desperation only to do our dirty work and expose themselves to yet new ways of being exploited by the empire beast of the north. Now they're in the belly of the beast, facing racist and sexist institutions that humiliate them and use them as pawns in our own domestic race and class wars. In Massachusetts, now, as well as many other communities in the United States, failing schools are being blamed on brown Spanish-speaking people from Latin America. It's easy for the government and the privileged to use Latin American immigrants as scapegoats because our society and our popular culture supports the idea that you can blame what is wrong on minority communities rather than on the powerful institutions that actually orchestrate what happens. **Domestic racism makes it possible for states to** get rid of bilingual education, and **allow urban schools to deteriorate to the point where even the army finds they cannot recruit from communities of color because the kids in those communities have not been taught how to read and write**. **For those people of color who can't escape the ghetto via the military, there's always incarceration**, where no education is required. Where you simply rot inside one of the main growth industries in the United States -- prisons -- the destination for a hugely disproportionate number of those people of color. We live in a world where the lucky immigrants in El Norte are the ones who are taking out the trash for those that sent down the helicopters and machine guns and financial planners tasked with systematically dismantling their homes, their native economies, their way of life. So you see, **the U.S. anti-war movement has to have fighting domestic racism on its agenda as well**. Racism at home not only destroys lives inside our borders, it props up a foreign policy that needs to be able to kill brown people with impunity. Part of the reason -- let's be frank -- that there isn't more grassroots pressure against the is war is because N. Americans are so thoroughly steeped in racism that **we are trained to believe that brown people's lives are not worth as much**. Even if, for some reason, U.S. institutions did not need racism to help protect power and privilege for the few, we would still need racism because it is integral to rationalizing our foreign policy. The same is true of sexism. As I was leaving Boston a few days ago, there was an article in the paper about the ongoing defunding of the UN Family Planning Agency and Bush's imposing of the Global Gag Rule on health clinics that receive U.S. funding. That means they're not allowed to talk about abortion as an option for pregnant women. Does Bush really care whether women in other countries have access to abortion? No. What he cares about is having mechanisms in place that allow for the control of populations. He cares about undermining democracy and building alliances with oppressive fundamentalist regimes that have their own reasons for limiting women's reproductive choices. **To enhance social control, Bush has to daily construct and support** patriarchal and social and **cultural practices at home.** Why? Partly because men don't want political participation of women domestically, and partly because they have to create the rationalizations for the alliances they are building with elites from other countries. By the way, I just want to texture what I am saying here by adding that the women served by these agencies are poor women. It's poor women who won't get the abortions. George Bush doesn't want his own daughters to have to resort to back-alley abortions. And they won't have to because they have money and they would be able to find other means. **Racism and** sexism and U.S. global **wars came together** rather **poignantly** recently. For months, in the States, the corporate media has been eagerly following the fate of Guatemalan Siamese twins who were born joined at the head. They were brought to the UCLA Mattel hospital for months of surgeries and treatments, and Mattel picked up the bill. For those of you who don't know, Mattel is the toy company that makes dolls for little girls. There are dolls that actually drool and pee, and give little girls early lessons in the joys of cleaning up baby's body fluids. There are Barbie dolls with impossibly huge and gravity-defying breasts that give girls early lessons in how inherently flawed they are. So while 200,000 peasants died in the 1980s in Guatemala at the hands a of U.S.-armed and trained military, many of these peasants brutally tortured and killed, and all of it very easily avoidable with a few minimum policy changes in the United States, you won't hear too much talk about that in my country. We don't know the first thing about Guatemalan peasants except that there are two lucky beneficiaries of the charitable Mattel.

#### Remember the last time critiquing Western knowledge production in a debate round ruptured Imperialism, Universities gladly permit such discourses by leftist academics, knowing that the proliferation of these discourses in the academy get co-opted by the sign economy and are graveyards for radical potential.

Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9

(The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC; <http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, 11/19 //shree)   
He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action.  **Let’s talk about the fight endlessly**, **but always** only **in their managed form**: **to perpetually deliberate**, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless.  So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far?  This accumulation is our shared history.  This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life.  A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning.  **As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad**, an incarceration apparatus in California, **it is** equally **invested here** in an apparatus **for managing social death**.  Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity.  **A** ‘**life**,’ then, which **serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death**: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed **to obscure the shit** and decay **in which our feet are planted**. Yes, **the university is a graveyard**, **but** it **is also** a factory: **a factory of meaning which produces civic life and** at the same time produces **social death**.  **A factory which produces** the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property).  Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere **discourse to shape our** desires and **distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state**, discourse **designed to make** our very moments here together into **a set of legible and fruitless demands**. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But **the ‘irrelevant’ departments** also **have their place**.  With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context.  As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, **co-opting** and containing **radical potential**.  And so **we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring** the most obvious fact **that we** ourselves **are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only** words which matter, **words about words which matter**.  **The university gladly permits** the precautionary **lectures on** biopower; on the **production of race** and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities.  A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism.  And all the **while power weaves the invisible nets which** contain and **neutralize all thought and action**, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls.

**Wilderson overlooks African Diaspora, it does not look at interconnectivity of events but rather small portions of the problem, this means that he never provides a clear alternative on how to fight and solve for blackness**

**Maty Ba, 11**

SAËR MATY BÂ, teaches film at Portsmouth University, September 2011 "The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation" book review of Red, Black & White: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms and Mama Africa: Reinventing Blackness in Bahia, Cultural Studies Review volume 17 number 2 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index pp. 381–91, WYO/JF

**A few pages into Red, White and Black**, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before **Wilderson’s black‐as‐social death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble.** This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimate‐ object of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And **yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film.** Furthermore, **Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent**. Again, **his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory**. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. **Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance.** Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film.

## Authenticity DA

#### The fight against blackness is a search for an authenticity that does not exist

**Johnson, 03**

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The title of this book suggests that “**blackness” does not belong to any one individual or group. Rather, individuals or groups appropriate this complex and nuanced racial signifier in order to circumscribe its boundaries or to exclude other individuals or groups**. When **blackness is appropriated to the exclusion of others, identity becomes political**. **Inevitably**, when **one attempts to lay claim to an intangible trope that manifests in various discursive terrains**, identity claims become embattled, or as noted in the quotation above by Baldwin, “color” or “blackness” becomes a “dangerous phenomenon.” Because the concept of blackness has no essence, “**black authenticity” is over determined—contingent on the historical, social, and political terms of its production**. Moreover, in the words of Regina Bendix: “**the notion of [black] authenticity implies the existence of its opposite. The fake, and this dichotomous construct is at the heart of what makes authenticity problematic.”4 Authenticity, then, is yet another trope manipulated for cultural capital.**

#### AUTHENTICITY FETISHIZATION AND ITS FEAR OF REASON AND VIOLENCE ALLOW US TO SPEND HOURS DEBATING THE FINE POINTS OF BAUDRILLARIAN ETHICS WHILE GAS CHAMBERS ARE BUILT

Bewes ‘97

[Timothy, doctorate in English Literature at the University of Sussex, *Cynicism and Postmodernity*, New York City: Verso, 1997,146-7//uwyo-ajl]

If it is unreasonable to suppose that the Final Solution was potentiated or even necessarily facilitated by Schmitt's theories, it is certainly the case that this metaphysical structure of domination in the Third Reich, whereby the status of public citizens is reduced to a level determined entirely in the 'natural' or biological realm of necessity, is foreshadowed in his 1927 essay. In an abstract and insidious way Schmitt introduces the idea that the 'transcendent' realm of the political, as a matter of course, will not accommodate a people with insufficient strength to ensure its own participation, and that such a fact is ipso facto justification for its exclusion. 'If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'130 Schmitt's concept of the 'political', quite simply, is nothing of the sort - is instead weighed down by necessity, in the form of what Marshall Berman calls German-Christian interiority - by its preoccupation with authenticity, that is to say, and true political 'identity'. Auschwitz is a corollary not of reason, understood as risk, but of the fear of reason, which paradoxically is a fear of violence. The stench of burning bodies is haunted always by the sickly aroma of cheap metaphysics.